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In the eighth book of Thucydides’ history, the Athenian general Phrynichus argued that the 
Athenians should not fight the Spartan fleet at Miletus. He declared that a defeat would force 
Athens to capitulate, and rather than take that risk, he withdrew. Thucydides praises this decision 
in the following manner: (8.27.5) 
“And he seemed, not on the present occasion more than afterwards, nor in this thing alone but also in 
whatever situation Phrynichus found himself, to be not unwise.” 
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Thucydides’ praise of this decision has been called “surprising in view of the losses to which his 
strategy condemned Athens in the next month.”2 In addition, Thucydides later relates other 
decisions of Phrynichus’s which could hardly be called “wise”. It is also apparent from 
Thucydides and other sources that the Athenians did not appreciate Phrynichus’ wisdom more 
and more, but instead bitterly reviled him long after they slew him. Why then does Thucydides 
praise him and why in these terms? This paper will evaluate Phrynichus’ actions, and then 
discuss Thucydides’ praise here in light of his earlier praise of Pericles. From this comparison, a 
better understanding of Thucydides’ judgments emerges. 
The first step is evaluating the consequences of Phrynichus’ decision and the constraints under 
which he was placed. At the time of the withdrawal, the Athenians had 68 ships, while those of 
the approaching Syracusans and Peloponnesians were 55. In addition, 20 Chian and 5 Spartan 
ships were blockaded by the Athenians in Miletus harbor, and it is reasonable to assume that they 
were aware of the approaching Spartan fleet and would assist them if possible.
3
 Not only were 
the Athenians outnumbered by at least 12 ships, but several of their ships were troopcarriers and 
would be less effective in a battle at sea. 
The Athenian navy often defeated forces of superior number, but, as Phrynichus pointed out, if 
they were to suffer defeat, Athens itself would be left almost defenseless. A decisive defeat 
would certainly end Athens’ eastern empire, including the vital Hellespont. The question here is 
not “Would a defeat at Miletus have been a serious blow for Athens?” because it no doubt would 
have been so, rather the question is “By withdrawing without a fight, did Phrynichus consign 
Athens to losses of such a magnitude that the risk of a decisive battle should have been taken?” 
Because Phrynichus withdrew from Miletus, the Peloponnesian fleet was able to take Iasus by 
surprise and with it Amorges, the satrap revolting from the king. “So they made a sudden attack 
upon Iasus and took it, as the inhabitants had no thought but that the ships were Athenian.” 
(8.28.2) This was a setback for Athens, but Thucydides does not blame it on Phrynichus. When 
Peisander accused Phrynichus of abandoning Amorges and Iasus, Thucydides does not consider 
the charge valid, “Peisander alleged that Phrynichus had betrayed Iasus and Amorges and 
slandered him.” (8.54.3) As Thucydides knew from personal experience, a charge of “betrayal” 
in Athens often meant that one did not accomplish all that the Athenians believed possible. All 
Peisander need “allege” is that Phrynichus refused to fight. By calling the accusation false, 
38 
 
Thucydides in effect reaffirmed that, to his mind, Phrynichus’ decision was the best one for 
Athens. Nevertheless, the loss of Iasus is a consequence of Phrynichus’ decision. 
The effect of the Athenian withdrawal upon relations with the allies is hard to measure. The 
Athenians had sent 25 ships to Lesbos to supress a revolt and establish order (8.23) just prior to 
the decision at Miletus. Yet immediately after it, the Peloponnesians recieved some envoys from 
Lesbos (8.32.1) requesting aid for renewing their revolt from Athens. However, Clazomenae, 
subdued by the same Athenian ships, later beat back a Spartan attack, even though the city was 
unwalled (8.31.3). From these two examples it is hard to see a widespread reaction among the 
allies to Phrynichus’ refusal to fight. 
The most important consequence is still more difficult to assess, and that is control of the sea. 
Until the Sicilian disaster, at least, Athens ruled the waves. Did Phrynichus’ decision concede 
control of the sea to Astyochus, possessor of the largest Peloponnesian fleet ever to sail in the 
Eastern Aegean? There are indications that Athens retains control, especially after 
reinforcements: “[the Athenians] controlled the sea and made descents upon Miletus” (8.30.2), 
“and their fleet at Samos made a number of descents upon the Peloponnesian fleet at Miletus; but 
when the latter did not come out to meet them, they retired again to Samos” (8.38.5)  
The Athenian position at sea seems no worse than before, but this is a false impression. 
Previously the Athenians had had complete superiority in naval experience and reputation, and 
this probably gave them more victories than numbers alone. After Miletus, the Peloponnesians 
had an established fleet in Ionia, and some freedom of action. After Miletus, the Athenians could 
not count on the opportunity for a decisive battle, because the Spartans did not need to fight one: 
in this war of attrition they could rely on further revolts of Athenian subject-allies.
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 These 
considerations suggest that Phrynichus should have risked a direct confrontation, and this is 
supported by close examination of Pericles’ speeches. 
Phrynichus’ cautionary advice has been called “Periclean”, and there are some parallels. Both 
Pericles and Phrynichus argued against fighting a decisive battle with the Peloponnesians. 
But Phrynichus the Athenian general, when he received from Leros accurate information about the enemy 
fleet, though his colleagues wished to wait and fight a decisive battle refused either to do this himself or to 
permit them or anyone else to do it.” (8.27.1) 
Pericles had similarly advised the Athenians earlier (1.143.5), when referring to battles on land: 
We must not give way to resentment against the Peloponnesians and risk a decisive battle with them, far 
superior in numbers as they are. If we win we shall have to fight them again in undiminished number, and 
if we fail, our allies, the source of our strength, are lost to us as well. 
A further point in common is their distinction between risks which are deemed necessary and 
“self-chosen dangers”.5 This phrase was used by Pericles at 1.144.1, when he tells the Athenians, 
“not to burden yourselves needlessly with dangers of your own choosing; for I am more afraid of 
our own mistakes than of the enemy’s plans.” Phrynichus uses this same phrase later in 8.27.3: 
It was not disgraceful, he said, for Athenians to give way before a hostile navy upon occasion, but it would 
be more disgraceful if under any circumstances whatsoever they should be defeated and have to make 
terms. The state would incur, not only disgrace, but also the greatest danger; for, after their past 
misfortunes, it was scarcely permissible for it when securely prepared of free will, or through absolute 
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necessity, to take the offensive in any direction, much less was it permissible, when there was no pressure, 
to rush into self-chosen dangers. 
Phrynichus does echo Pericles’ cautions against taking unnecessary risks, but Thucydides’ 
Pericles encourages the Athenians to accept risks, when they are calculated and believed to be 
advantageous to the city.
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 He is vehemently opposed to withdrawal from a position of strength. 
He was essentially the original proponent of the domino theory, with his belief that with each 
small capitulation a larger one will follow (1.140.5). He accepted the loss of Athenian land 
because he had no way to prevent it, but he intended to surrender no part of the sea. 
[absolute mastery of the sea], if we hold fast to it and preserve it, will easily restore these losses, but let 
men once submit to others and even what has been won in the past has a way of being lessened. (2.61.3) 
Here then, is the crux of their differences, while Phrynichus believed that “it was not disgraceful 
for Athenians to give way before a hostile navy upon occasion”, Pericles shows why Spartans 
should be denied the sea: 
the art of seamanship ... is an advantage they will not easily secure...How then could men do 
anything worth mention who are tillers of the soil and not seamen, especially since they will not 
be permitted to practice, because we will always be lying in wait for them with a large fleet? For 
if they had to cope with only a small fleet lying in wait, they might perhaps risk an engagement, 
in their ignorance getting courage from mere numbers; but if their way is blocked by a large fleet, 
they will remain inactive, their skill will deteriorate through lack of practice, and that in itself will 
make them more timid. (1.142.6-8) 
It can be argued that, after the destruction of the Sicilian expedition, the situation had changed so 
much that it would be impossible to adhere to Pericles original policy. This has some merit, but 
the Sicilian defeat and the sea battles in Ionia were fought primarily with Syracusan and Ionian 
ships, not Peloponnesian. The Spartans were still subject to the Athenian blockade, as is seen 
when the Athenians bottled them up near Corinth: 
They were so discouraged, because in this their first undertaking in the Ionian war they had failed, that they 
from this time on ceased planning to send out the ships that were in home waters, but on the contrary even 
thought of recalling some that had previously gone out to sea. (8.11.3) 
This shows that the power of the Athenian navy was still feared by the Spartans. However, when 
some of the Athenian ships holding the blockade at Corinth were sent to quell the revolt at Chios 
and the two forces left were equal in number, the Peloponnesian fleet managed to break the 
blockade and captured four Athenian ships in the process (8.20.1). 
Spartan fear of Athenian naval superiority endures despite the withdrawal from Miletus. 
Afterwards in Thucydides’ history the Spartan navy only offers battle on one occasion (8.63.1-2, 
and at that time the Athenians at Samos were divided into factions and did not come out to 
oppose them). Furthermore, Tissaphernes assumes that the Spartan navy would lose in a decisive 
battle: “they might be forced to fight the Athenians and suffer defeat” (8.57.1). However, this 
fear may be more imagined than real, and Phrynichus himself mentions in a later speech that the 
King would not be likely to support the Athenian cause “now that the Peloponnesians were at 
home on the sea quite as much as the Athenians” (8.48.4). This too can be seen as a legacy of 
Phrynichus’ decision. 
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The ships which were approaching Phrynichus were composed of 22 ships from Sicily, 
presumably with veteran crews, and 33 recently equipped ships from the Peloponnese, 
presumably with inexperienced crews. In the two years since the destruction of the Sicilian 
expedition, all of Athens, including Phrynichus, had heard of the technical innovations of the 
Syracusan engineers, and hopefully they could apply that knowledge. At Syracuse there was only 
crowded harbor fighting, and so the impending battle at Miletus would put them at a distinct 
disadvantage. The Athenians generally choose to fight in open water, where their superior 
nautical skill would rule the day. Phrynichus had a splendid opportunity to eliminate the enemy 
fleet before it became too capable. It is not immediately apparent that Phrynichus’ decision was, 
as Thucydides says, “not unwise”. 
Despite this speculation, we are unable to give a final evaluation of the decision to retreat. We do 
not know the nature of the “accurate information” (8.27.1) concerning the Peloponnesian fleet 
possessed by the Athenian generals. We do not know how many Athenian vessels were troop-
carriers, and hence less useful for a sea battle. The exact difficulties of facing the enemy fleet 
while blockading another force are unclear. Even assuming that all this and more were known, 
the decision would still be no more than a gamble, as the outcome of the battle is subject to “the 
unexpected turns that belong to human life” (8.24.5). Phrynichus refuses to take this gamble, and 
Thucydides approves. Though many of the factors considered in this gamble are lost to us, an 
attempt can be made to understand Thucydides’ motivation for siding with Phrynichus. 
The problem is twofold, for not only must a plausible explanation be given for the judgment, but 
attention must be paid to the unusual manner in which he gives it. He asserts that Phrynichus was 
judged wise in this decision all the more as time passed by, which does not correlate well with 
other sources for this period. In addition, he claims that Phrynichus behaved wisely throughout 
his career, which is slightly surprising in light of the facts later reported in Thucydides. 
It is apparent that the Athenian demos did not grow to appreciate more and more the wisdom of 
Phrynichus. From 8.54.3 we learn that the Athenians relieved him of his command on the request 
of Peisander, although he later becomes a leading figure in the oligarchy. Lysias 8.7 mentions 
rewards offered for the murder of Phrynichus, and this is supported by an inscription from about 
409 BC (ML #85). The speaker of Lysias 20 not only disparages Phrynichus’ general esteem and 
capacities, but regards being related to Phrynichus as if it were a crime (11-12). Lykurgus 112 
states that after Phrynichus’ murder “on investigation they found that Phrynichus had been trying 
to betray the city” and that his bones were cast out of Attica. This account is supported by 
Plutarch Alcibiades 25.10. This treason charge probably refers to his latter actions in the 
oligarchy, i.e. the embassy to Sparta and the fortifications at Eetionia. Still, it seems safe to say 
that among the Athenian jurymen who heard these speeches, few would aver that Phrynichus 
acted intelligently in whatever situation he found himself. Thucydides seems to be speaking for 
himself, or at least for a minority, when he claims that consciousness of Phrynichus’ wisdom was 
not decayed by time. 
The claim that wisdom was demonstrated “in whatever situation Phrynichus found himself” 
seems incongruous with other reports of his actions found in Thucydides, specifically the 
intrigue with Astyochus. According to book eight, motivated by fear of Alcibiades, Phrynichus 
writes to the Spartan general, telling him about Alcibiades double-dealing and proposing that he 
be put to death. Astyochus betrays this letter to Alcibiades, who notifies the other Athenians in 
turn. Then, under suspicion for being a traitor, he writes again to Astyochus, offering him the 
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opportunity to destroy the entire Athenian army at Samos. Apparently he would have gone 
through with the plan, had he not found out that Astyochus had again betrayed him to Alcibiades. 
By quickly preparing against the Spartan attack, he appears blameless when a letter from 
Alcibiades arrives, charging him with treachery. 
As the story is told in Thucydides, Phrynichus does not seem in any way wise--he comes through 
this wringer not by demonstrating any intelligence, but by having the good fortune to land butter 
side up.  
There are many flaws in the story as it is written, and accounts by both modern and ancient 
writers credit Phrynichus with a defter handling of the situation.
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 Because it is crucial to the story 
that the letters are revealed to the general public, their contents as reported by Thucydides are 
very likely true. Virtually everyone but Thucydides assumes that Phrynichus did not intend to 
betray the Athenian fleet, but rather counted on a second betrayal by Astyochus, with the 
eventual result that his name would be cleared, as in fact it was. The reasons given in the letters 
for wishing to betray Athens are weak, and there is no reason why they cannot stand as clever 
mechanisms for the benefit of the city. The story as it reads in Thucydides, at any rate, does not 
jibe with his appraisal of Phrynichus at 8.27.5. 
An explanation for Thucydides blanket approval of Phrynichus can be found in his second 
appearance. The way Phrynichus is lauded at 8.27.5 prepares the reader to listen for intelligent 
things from the mouth of Phrynichus. In this way Thucydides can use him as a mouthpiece, 
without any apparent form of judgment from Thucydides (8.48.4-7). Everything he says in this 
‘proto-speech’ comes true by the end of the war, and yet there is no editorial comment. Later 
events show that Alcibiades truly did not care what constitution Athens had, that the Athenians 
chief concern should have been avoiding factions,
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 that the King would not attach himself to 
Athens, and that the allied cities when under oligarchies would not support Athens any more than 
before (8.64.3-5). By extending his earlier praise of Phrynichus to his entire career, Thucydides 
puts emphasis upon the intelligence of this speech without seeming to make comment. 
This to some extent may explain the unusual superlatives attached to the judgment of 
Phrynichus’ decision, but not Thucydides’ reason for praising the decision at all. In his praise of 
Phrynichus and Pericles, Thucydides appears to value the method by which a decision was 
reached as much as the actual decision. The two are not unrelated, as the value of the latter 
depends to a certain extent upon the value of the former, i.e. a plan formulated using careful 
reasoning will probably, but not necessarily, be superior to one conceived in haste or carelessly. 
Phrynichus and Pericles both make mention of the necessity of reason: “He would never, he 
declared, yielding to the consideration of disgrace, hazard a decisive battle unreasonably” 
(8.27.2). And Pericles says at 2.62.5
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it is intelligence that confirms courage--the intelligence that makes one able to look down upon one’s 
opponent, and which proceeds not by hoping for the best (a method only valuable in desperate situations), 
but by estimating what the facts are, and thus obtaining a clearer vision of what to expect. 
Phrynichus and Pericles consider more aspects of the problems at hand than other speakers. They 
notice what others fail to notice, or very often even refuse to notice. They arrive at their 
judgments through independent reasoning, often setting themselves at variance with both the 
mob and the typical “gut reaction.” Pericles’ plan calls for the abandonment of all property 
outside the city walls, and this certainly goes against the grain: 
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Indeed, had I thought that I should persuade you, I should have urged you to go forth and lay them waste 
yourselves, and thus show the Peloponnesians that you will not, for the sake of such things, yield them 
obedience. (1.143.5) 
Thucydides admires both Pericles and Phrynichus not just because of their intelligence, but 
because that quality governs their emotions--allowing them to pursue calculated plans while at 
the same time restraining the anger directed at an invading army, the shame of giving ground to a 
Spartan fleet, and the wrath of both colleagues and crowd. This bond between the two generals is 
shown by Thucydides noting that their actions seem better as the years go by: “After his 
[Pericles’] death his foresight as to the war was still more fully recognized” (2.65.6) The 
foresight that Thucydides praises in these two men is their ability to separate their strategic 
calculations from the emotions of the day. Only later, when the clouding emotions have faded, 
can the mob recognize the wisdom of their decisions. 
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NOTES 
1 
This translation is mostly based on C. F. Smith’s in the Loeb edition of Thucydides. All subsequent 
translations are taken directly from this edition or from other Loeb volumes when another author is cited. 
2 
Gomme, Andrewes, & Dover, A Historical Commentary on Thucydides, Volume V (Oxford University 
Press, 1981), p. 65. 
3 
According to 8.26, the recently arrived fleet learned of conditions in Miletus from Alcibiades, who had 
been in the city himself, and it was he who urged them to come to the aid of Miletus. Therefore some 
means of communication may have been possible. 
4 
This facet of Phrynichus’ decision is pointed out in Gomme, Andrewes, & Dover, pp. 67-68. 
5 
Ibid, p. 64. 
6 
Thucydides 2.40.3, 2.42.4, to name but a few. 
7 
This incident is covered in detail in H. D. Westlake, “Phrynichus and Astyochus”, JHS 76 (1956), p. 
100. Most of the flaws in Thucydides account are reported in this source. Other writers who also credit 
Phrynichus with some sense are P. A. Brunt, “Thucydides and Alcibiades”, REG, 65 (1952), p. 76. and 
Plutarch Alcibiades 25:8. Plutarch seems to have a bit of both traditions, because 25.6-7 seem to indicate 
that he fully intended to betray the Athenian fleet, while 25:8 shows that he was playing a double game. 
8
 “and they did not finally succumb until they had in their private quarrels fallen upon one another and 
been brought to ruin” (2.65.13) 
9 
This is Rex Warner’s translation, because at this point Smith’s is hard to follow. 
 
